0691155240 
Hardback Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit / Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber.
Publication year: 2014
Format: Hardback
Publisher: Princeton : Princeton University Press,
Resource type: Physical
ISBN: 9780691155241 (hbk.) : 0691155240 (hbk. : acid-free pap
Notes:
If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses.
Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries - but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, this book demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances.
Specialized.
Series title: The Princeton economic history of the western world
Description:
550 pages ; 25 cm.
Available at:
